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ABSTRACT - Magellan has been one of
NASA most successful spacecraft, returning more
science data than all planetary spacecraft
combined. The Magellan Spacecraft Team (SCT)
has maximized the science return with innovative
operational techniques to overcome anomalies and
to perform activities for which the spacecraft was
not designed. Commanding the spacecraft was
originally time consuming because the standard
development process was envisioned as manual
tasks. The Program understood that reducing
mission operations costs were essential for an
extended mission. Management created an
environment which encouraged automation of
routine tasks, allowing staff reduction while
maximizing the science data returned. Data
analysis and trending, command preparation, and
command reviews are some of the tasks that were
automated. The SCT has accommodated
personnel reductions by improving operations
efficiency while returning the maximum science
data possible.
MISSION OBJECTIVES T h e
objectives of the Magellan program were to place
a spacecraft with a radar sensor in orbit around
Venus; obtain, reduce, and analyze the scientific
data from the planet and make these results
available to the public and the scientific
community. The Magellan scientific mission
objectives were:
1. To improve the knowledge of the tectonics
and geologic history of Vet us by analysis
of the surface morphology and the
processes which control it.
2. To improve the knowledge of the
geophysics of Venus, principally its
density distribution and dynamics.
3. To improve the knowledge of the small
scale surface physics.
The objectives of the science experiments were:
1. Imaging: To produce contiguous images
of at least 70 percent (with a goal of 90
percent) of the surface of Venus with no
N95- 17218
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systematic gaps except for one pole, and
with a surface radar resolution of at least
360 meters (surface radar resolution is
defined as the distance between the 3dB
points of the main lobe of the radar system
impulse function).
2. Altimetry: To produce maps of the
topographic and radar scattering
characteristics of the planet Venus with
height resolution commensurate with the
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) range
resolution and coverage commensurate
with the SAR coverage.
3. Gravity: To refine the low degree and
order gravity field of Venus and to
produce high resolution (several hundred
kilometer horizontal scale) gravity maps
wherever possible.
HISTORY - A single Magellan (MGN)
spacecraft was launched from Kennedy Space
Center Launch Complex 39B on May 4, 1989, on
board the Shuttle Atlantis. The launch vehicle
was a Shuttle Orbiter/Inertial Upper State (IUS)
combination. Once in the shuttle parking orbit,
the IUS and MGN spacecraft combination was
deployed from the cargo bay. After the orbit
coast period, the IUS injected the MGN
spacecraft into an Earth-Venus transfer trajectory.
The MGN spacecraft is powered by two
single degree-of-freedom, sun-tracking solar
panels and is three-axis stabilized by reaction
wheels using gyros and a star scanner for attitude
reference. When launched, the spacecraft carried
a solid rocket motor for Venus orbit insertion. A
small hydrazine system was provided for
trajectory correction and certain attitude control
functions. Earth communications with the Deep
Space Network (DSN) is by means of S- and X-
band channels, operating via low- and medium-
gain antennas and a 3.7 meter high-gain antenna
dish which is rigidly attached to the spacecraft.
The high-gain antenna also functioned as the
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mapping antenna
during orbital operations.
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Magellanfollowed a Type IV interplanetary
trajectory to Venus,which representsa transfer
anglearoundtheSunof slightly greaterthan540
degrees.The useof the Type IV trajectorywas
requiredby theorbit geometryof EarthandVenus
for the May 1989 opportunity. The Type I
trajectoryopportunity in October1989hadbeen
allocated to Galileo for its Venus-Earth-Earth
GravityAssisttrajectoryto Jupiter.
The interplanetary cruise phase lasted
approximately 15 months. Cruise activities
included calibrations of the gyros, the attitude
reference unit and the antennas, daily star
calibrations,threetrajectorycorrectionmaneuvers
to insureproperapproachgeometry,a functional
testof theradarsubsystem,andathree-daytestof
themappingcapability.
MGN arrived at Venuson August 10, 1990.
By tiring the solid rocket motor slightly before
Venus closest approach, the desiredperiapsis
latitudenear 10degreesNorth wasattained.The
spacecraftwasplacedin anelliptical orbit around
Venuswith aperiodof 3.26hours. Theplanned
in-orbit checkout (IOC) period was cut short
becausea timing idiosyncrasy in the on-board
Attitude andArticulation Control flight software
causedthe spacecraftto enter sating during the
starcalibrationof thesecondtestmappingorbit.
The imaging data processedfrom the 1.5 test
orbitsprior to satingwasof suchhighquality that
theprojectdecidedto terminateIOC followingthe
satingrecovery and enterdirectly into mapping
operations.
The prime mission (Cycle 1) began on
September15, 1990, and lasted 243 days, the
time required for Venus to make one rotation
under the spacecraftorbit. Cycle 2 startedon
May 15, 1991,and Cycle 3 startedon January
15, 1992,andcontinuedto September15, 1992.
Typical activitiesduring theradarmappingorbits
areshownin Figure 1. Mappingoperationswere
halted after the third cycle due to a transmitter
failure. Thescienceemphasisshiftedto thethird
scienceexperiment,gravity data. Cycle 4 was
devotedto collectinggravitydataandplanningfor
aerobrakingoperations.
Following Cycle 4, Magellan'speriapsiswas
loweredto placethespacecraftin theatmosphere
eachperiapsispassin orderto slow thespacecraft
andnearlycircularizetheorbit. Magellanwasthe
first planetaryspacecraftto use aerobrakingto
changeits orbit. Sinceaerobrakinghadnotbeen
accomplishedbeforeand the spacecraftwasnot
designedto aerobrake,the planning tasksbroke
new ground. Aerobraking was successfully
accomplishedin seventydays(plannedfor eighty)
andplacedthe spacecraftinto a 500 km by 200
km orbit. Cycles 5 and 6 have collected high
resolutiongravitygiving scientist their first view
of the subsurfaceat thepoles. In Cycle 5 and6,
Magellan has also performed several Radio
ScienceOccultation,Bi-staticandQuasi-specular
Radarexperiments.
Magellan's accomplishments include:
mapping over 98% of the planet surface,
obtaininghigh resolution gravity dataover95%
of the surface, successfully accomplishing
aerobrakingto changethe orbit, andperforming
several other experiments (Radio Science
Occultation, Bi-static, Quasi-specular and
Windmill).
OPERATIONS PROCESS Prior to
launch, the mission operationsproceduresand
plans for the Spacecraft Team (SCT) were
developedon thepremisethattheorbit wouldbe
repetitive and day-to-day tasks would thus be
simple and low cost. The majority of the tasks
(approximately70%) would involve analyzing
and trendingthe engineeringdatareceivedfrom
thespacecraft,while theremainingtimewouldbe
for thecommandprocess.Thedataanalysisand
trending workload estimate was based on
previous planetary spacecraft operations that
reliedon simpledisplaysandmanuallyanalyzing
engineeringdata. For Magellan, the spacecraft
dataanalysisand trending would be performed
using the new JPL multi-mission operations
process and multi-tasking workstations, but
trendingwasstill perceivedasamanualprocess.
The commandprocesswasdevelopedusing
sequencesbasedon repetitive mapping orbital
operations, intending to minimize the effort
requiredfor commanding. Themissionplanning
and sequencedevelopmentprocessesrelied on
meetings,paper products and manual reviews
similar to previousspacecraft's.Ratherthanthe
simpleprocessenvisioned,thecommandprocess
resulted in complex operations that were
continuouslytweakedto improvethesciencedata
quality.
The mission progressedas plannedand all
flight sequencemilestoneswere met. However,
theallocationof thework forceto accomplishthe
taskswasradicallydifferent. Immediatelyafter
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Figure I Typical Mapping Activities
launch, anomalies occurred on the spacecraft
which required the subsystems engineers to spend
an unexpected larger portion of their time
performing sequence preparation and validation.
The difficulty of operating and maintaining the
health of the spacecraft early on (thermal control
and star scan problems) combined with a labor
intensive command process resulted in a very
high percentage of the work effort being placed
on commanding. This percentage decreased as
the mission operations matured, but the final
workload split was approximately seventy percent
involving commanding and the remainder for data
analysis and trending.
The SCT, faced with a labor intensive
command process, a strong desire to obtain
higher quantity and quality science data, and
budget constraints realized the need to further
reduce the time required for the spacecraft data
analysis and trending. Using the framework of
the multi-mission operations tools and the
processing capability of the workstations, the
SCT developed batch scripts and other software
routines that allowed the spacecraft data to be
collected, analyzed, and displayed automatically.
The data analysis and trending were performed
during off hours and the results were available for
the engineers to examine when they arrived in the
morning. If the results were nominal, the
engineers could then devote their time to the
command process. If an anomaly was present,
their time was used to determine the cause and
corrective action, which generally involved more
commanding.
The automation of the data analysis and
trending was achieved because the tools allowed
these tedious tasks to be performed by computers.
In addition, the SCT was comprised of engineers
with the necessary computer skills to automate
tasks and encouraged by program management to
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perform continuousprocessimprovement. The
automationprocesswas further enhancedby the
SCT conviction that the mission operations
budgetmust be reducedif anextendedmission
was to be affordable. The planning for the
successfulAerobrakingoperationsaccomplished
duringCycle 4 wasmadepossibleby themission
operations savings during the earlier cycles.
These savings were the direct results of the
automationandimprovementprocess.
MAGELLAN COMMAND PROCESS -
The Mission OperationsPlan was for spacecraft
sequencesto be developed using a standard
process(initially a twelve weekduration)which
relied on storedcommandsto perform the tasks
necessaryto obtain sciencedata. In addition to
mapping commands, health and maintenance
commandswere also to be included with the
standard (stored) sequence. The standard
commandprocessutilized repetitive commands
eachorbit with minor periodicparameterupdates
to minimizeoperationscosts.
However,this simplicity wasnotrealizeddue
to theprogram'sdesireto maximizethequalityof
thesciencedata.To improvethesciencedata,the
frequency of parameter updates had to be
increased.Additional complexity arosebecause
of the needto managethermal control and star
scanissues. Prior to VenusOrbit Insertion,the
SCTrealizedthattheplanto sendanewmapping
sequenceveryweekwouldbedifficult toachieve
at the current staffing level despite the time
savingsfrom automationof thedataanalysisand
trending. Thecreativenessof the engineerswas
allowedto manifestitself, resultingin anextended
sequence(two weeks)andmanageableparameter
updatesthe staff could accommodatewhile still
obtainingthehighestqualitysciencedata.
As spacecraft anomalies developed and
operatingidiosyncrasiesbecameapparent,non-
stored (called non-standard) commandswere
requiredto meetmaintenanceissues,investigate
anomalies and conduct characterization tests.
Thesenon-standardcommandswere developed
using the standardcommandprocessbut could
not beplacedin the storedsequencedueto their
nearrealtimenature.
Standard Command Process - As shown
in the orbit profile (Figure 1), the mappingdata
collectionandplaybackrequiredthespacecrafto
performsix maneuverseachorbit. In additionto
developing the commands to maneuver the
spacecraft,commands(Figure2) wererequiredto
controltheradarmappingparameters,managethe
tape recorders, perform desaturations of the
reaction wheels, and manage the
telecommunications ystem. A typical orbit had
overa hundredseparatecommandsto perform.
In addition, the SCT had over a thousand
variablesin flight softwareto trackandmaintain.
In order to perform the mapping mission,
mapping and flight software parameterswere
storedon-board. Mapping parametersincluded
the orbit's periapsis time, radar parameters
tailored for theupcomingterrain anda mapping
quaternionpolynomialcoefficientfile requiredto
constantlychangethe mapping attitude. Flight
softwareparameterswerethestarscanparameters
and gyro bias and scalefactors. Also updated
each sequenceload were sating parametersfor
possibleuseby the fault protectionsystem.This
complexity wasunderestimatedprior to launch
and combined with non-standardcommanding
contributedto the increasein effort requiredfor
thestandardprocess.
The original plan, onceon orbit, called for a
new sequenceof commandsto beuplinkedto the
spacecraft every week. Before Venus Orbit
Insertion (VOI), the plan was changed to
uplinkinga sequenceeverytwo weeksbecauseit
was realized the programcould not supportthe
workload involved to develop and review a
sequenceeach week. Each standardtwo week
sequencetook approximately12weeksto develop
which meantthat the SCTwasworking onup to
six sequencesat atime. This workloadwaslabor
intensivedue to the amountof time requiredto:
generateparameters;develop and review three
cycles (preliminary, intermediateand final) of
SequenceEvents Files (SEF); review other
uplink products;andperforma testin theSystem
Verification Laboratory. The standardsequence
cycle was marked by meetings, reviews, and
reamsof paper. The amount of time spent in
meetingswasalsounderestimated.Meetingtime
includedpresentationpreparation,futuresequence
planning, reviewing developedsequences,and
presentingsubsystemperformance.In Cycle 1,it
wasestimatedthat a typical subsystemengineer
couldspendtwentyto twenty-fivehoursperweek
in meetings. Adding to the complexity was
trackingsix sequencesat once,ensuringthefight
parameterswere developed and coordinating
activitiesbetweensequences.
After the successfulcompletionof Cycle 1,
thenumberof peopleon theSCTslowly
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Figure 2 Typical Mapping Commands and Flow
decreased as personnel left the program. It was
apparent that the existing standard process could
not be supported with the smaller staff. A revised
standard process was developed which
eliminated the intermediate SEF products and took
advantage of further automation to reduce time for
command development, generation, and reviews.
The new process took six weeks to produce the
uplink commands thus reducing the number of
sequences in work to three. The new process
also reduced the amount of time required to
prepare products by eliminating non-value added
traditions such as management approval of
technical parameters. To help achieve the reduced
schedule, standard spacecraft maneuver times
were developed which would reduced the analysis
required for each sequence. The standardized
maneuvers were never fully realized since
spacecraft anomalies required each sequence to be
as umque as in the first cycle. The new standard
sequence process reduced the number of
meetings, automated reviews and consumed less
paper since electronic versions of uplink products
were used. This six week process continued
through the third mapping cycle when mapping
operations were halted due to failed transmitters.
The fourth cycle was a gravity only cycle and
saw a reduction in the amount of work required
because the mapping associated parameter
development and reviews were not necessary.
The program moved to three week sequences
which meant only two sequences were in work at
any one time since the standard process duration
remained at six weeks. This allowed a smaller
work force (thirty people) to continue to develop
standard sequences and non-standard commands
and prepare for aerobraking operations at the
completion of the fourth cycle.
The .program was presented with an
opportunity to obtain high resolution global
gravity data by nearly circularizing the orbit
through aerobraking. Aerobraking the spacecraft
was a high risk endeavor since it had never been
attempted before with a planetary spacecraft. In
addition, aerobraking was to be performed with a
spacecraft that was not designed for it. The
program engineers had to develop the aerobraking
profile (attitude and duration) and commands for
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performing aerobraking. The existing mapping
block did not meetthe requirements,thereforea
new aerobrakingblock had to bedevelopedand
tested. This full time effort consumed
approximatelyhalf of theSCT which meantthe
remaining half performed the nominal tasksto
obtain the important gravity data. Aerobraking
operations were developed to ensure that the
necessary timing updates (to account for the
shrinking orbit) were sent to the spacecraft in a
timely manner. At the start of aerobraking, timing
commands were sent to the spacecraft three times
per week. As the orbit period shrunk, the timing
commands were sent every day. At the end of
aerobraking, timing commands were sent up to
three times per day. Aerobraking was
accomplished in seventy days, ten days ahead of
schedule.
Following aerobraking, process
improvements continued with a change in the way
sequences were implemented to take advantage of
the near circular orbit. The length of the
sequences was increased to three weeks which
meant the SCT was working on one sequence at a
time. It was these types of improvements that
allowed the SCT to collect high resolution gravity
data and perform special experiments (Radio
Science Occultation, Bi-static, Quasi-specular and
Windmill) with a significantly smaller staff.
Non-Standard Command Process
Initially there was no set process to send a non-
standard command to the spacecraft. Each
subsystem would determine the need, develop the
commands, and then present the results to the
Mission Director for approval. This resulted in
significant re-work as an alternative solution
would surface during the presentation to the
Mission Director. The alternative solutions led to
confusion which resulted in a high number of
command related incidents. The non-standard
workload was a significant portion of the
commanding process because solutions to
problems were often re-worked several times.
Several months prior to Venus Orbit
Insertion, the Proposed Engineering Change
(PEC) process was developed. The PEC process
brought discipline to the non-standard
commanding effort and reduced the number of
command incidents to near zero. The PEC
process is started when a subsystem engineer
completes a PEC form which describes the reason
for the proposed change, the impacts if not
implemented, the need date, and alternative
solutions. The PEC is then reviewed by the
members of the SCT, updated and then presented
to the Mission Director at the Engineering Review
Board (ERB) for approval. If approved, the SCT
is then authorized to implement the proposed
solution and send the non-standard command(s)
to the spacecraft. By holding a peer review,
impacts to other subsystems are identified as well
as better solutions not considered by the
originator. This process forced a disciplined
thought process which proved invaluable during
anomaly recoveries. Over 270 PECs have been
written. Of these, only sixteen have been
disapproved; the majority were early in the
mission as a result of conflicting requests. The
small number of disapproval's indicates the PECs
brought forth viable solutions in which all
members of the SCT and program management
concurred. Management developed confidence in
the SCT and the solutions to anomalies due to the
discipline created by the PEC process.
An example of process improvement is the
Express Command. Express Commands are
commands that have minimal impact to the
spacecraft and were being presented as a PEC on
a regular basis. Examples of express commands
are memory read out, star scan parameter
changes, and turning transmitter sub-carriers on
or off. Express Command eliminated the
repetitive workload of regularly presenting PECs
to the ERB. One PEC was created that defined
who could send a command, the conditions in
which the command could be sent and the follow
up action. Prior to Express Command every
command had to be approved by the Mission
Director. Now these commands required only
approval by the appropriate subsystem, thus
empowering the engineers.
REMOTE OPERATIONS - Magellan was
the first JPL spacecraft to be flown from a remote
location. This posed the problem of how to
effectively communicate without face-to-face
contact with the other person. The remote
arrangement also required that JPL management
give up much of its "routine control" over the
SCT. By remotely locating the SCT, engineers
with more Magellan spacecraft experience were
enticed to support mission operations. All
subsystem had team members who had been part
of all phases of the program. If these engineers
had been required to relocate to JPL, many of
these experienced individuals would not have
been part of the SCT.
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The voice communication problem between
the remotely located project teams was difficult to
solve. Initially the teleconferencing capability
was minimal (one speaker phone in a small
conference room). Prior to VOI, a large
conference room with multiple microphones was
made available which improved the technical
portion of the voice communication problem.
Although both the Denver and the JPL sides
worked very hard to effectively communicate,
problems still existed. One of the main
difficulties was understanding the other side's
everyday workload problems. To maximize this
understanding, representatives from both sides
would travel to the other's facilities on a regular
basis. These representatives were usually the
Leads of various subsystems/teams. By spending
one week every three months at the other person's
location these leads developed an appreciation for
each other's constraints and abilities. This
rotating representative eliminated the belief that
the other side "had it easier".
STAFFING - The success of the Magellan
Venus Radar Mapping mission has been largely
the result of the outstanding performance of the
flight system, however, some credit must be
given to the mission operations team and the
staffing plan. The staffing plan included the
selection of the right people, the organizational
structure at the beginning of the program, and
systematic downsizing as the program matured.
Much of the extended mission operations,
including aerobraking, would not have been
possible without significant reduction in the size
of the SCT. The original plan provided for
thirteen engineers monitoring the health of the
spacecraft. As the program developed, it became
apparent that the simple flight system developed
as a low cost solution for the original VOIR
program would involve a very complex mission
operation if the Magellan science return was to be
realized. In addition, the flight software and the
fault protection system proved to be extremely
complex and their verification and characterization
continued during the Cruise Phase to ensure its
readiness to support VOI and Mapping
Operations.
At launch the SCT had sixty people organized
as shown in Figure 3. This number grew to
seventy as VOI approached. As mapping
operation settled into a routine, the staff level was
reduced to fifty by the end of the Cycle 1 and
remained steady until the end of Cycle 2. At the
end of Cycle 2, spacecraft telecommunication
transmitter A's failure caused a major re-planning
effort. The resulting potential funding cutoff
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encouraged the program to look for cost
reductions to keep the mission alive. The process
of staff reduction while maintaining team morale
and productivity and continuing the science
mission was a major challenge. This challenge
was accepted by the team because of a
fundamental belief that a continuation of the
mapping mission would yield outstanding science
results, but would only be possible if the size of
the team and the resulting cost could be
significantly reduced. The team size reduction
was a product of recommendations and
brainstorming sessions by the whole team. Any
reduction in staffing was, therefore embraced by
the team regardless of its impact on an individual.
The staff reduction effort continued until thirty
people remained at the start of Cycle 4. The
staffing leveled out at thirty people as the team
continued mission operations and planned and
conducted aerobraking. After the successful
completion of aerobraking, the staff was reduced
to fifteen people. At the end of the mission, the
SCT was comprised of nine people some of
whom were part time.
The staff reduction was accomplished in a
positive manner since career growth opportunities
on other contracts were available to nearly all of
the team members with special skills gained from
the Magellan experience. As these engineers left
the program, the organization was restructured
and/or the roles and responsibilities were
distributed among the remaining team members.
This process of "belt tightening" gave more
responsibility and growth opportunities to the
remaining staffing and had a positive impact on
the overall team morale despite the ongoing staff
reduction. The loss of senior staff did not
significantly impact operations because remaining
engxneers were ready to assume their
responsibilities. The automation process that was
occurring simultaneously with the staff reduction
enabled the available resources to return the
maximum science data possible.
Management played an important role by
identifying and keeping those individuals who
could perform multiple tasks and/or encouraging
individuals to become proficient in multiple tasks.
This identification process was achieved by
providing opportunities for engineers to excel.
Throughout the program, management was not
satisfied with the status quo. Instead,
management encouraged the Leads to do more
with less, so when funding faced reduction the
SCT was able to respond quickly with proposed
staff reductions.
CONCLUSIONS - Software automation,
process improvement, the management
environment and a cooperative flight system are
the main reasons Magellan has enjoyed such great
success. The management philosophy created an
environment of continuous process improvement
that allowed the SCT to perform a wide variety of
tasks with a steadily decreasing staff.
The areas that realized time saving due to
automation were sequence preparation, sequence
validation, and data analysis and trending.
Sequence preparation saw significant savings
through the electronic transfer of parameters and
automating command generation procedures.
Sequence validation automation was achieved
by the creation of software tools designed to
replace the manual checks of the command
products. Each subsystem had its own checklist
that contained the steps necessary to manually
validate the command products. As the engineers
gained confidence in the checklists, software tools
were written to perform the manual checks. This
reduced the time to review a typical sequence
from eight hours to two hours.
Data analysis and trending were also
automated through the use of software and
workstation tools. The primary source of
automation was the generation of programs and
scripts to carry out repetitive tasks that the
engineers were required to perform each day.
Many of these tasks were not completely
characterized prior to launch, so the creation of
software tools during spacecraft development was
limited. After launch, when the spacecraft
performance and ground data systems capabilities
were better understood, each subsystem engineer
produced a tool set that allowed them to perform
their jobs more efficiently. It is important to note
that the software coding and script writing was
performed by the subsystem engineers and not a
software development staff. This created the
scenario where the end user was also the
programmer, so the tools developed meet the
needs without significant interaction.
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